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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effect of illegal oil trading on the level of per capita income in Nigeria between 1995 
and 2012. By employing the e-views econometric software, the unit root, co-integration and granger causality 
tests were carried out on the secondary data set, to make it amenable to the application of the vector 
autoregressive (VAR) modeling of the ordinary least square multiple regression. It was revealed, among others, 
that a significant relationship exists between the illegal oil trading and the level of per capita income in Nigeria. 
The paper further revealed that the volume of oil theft as an explanatory variable met the a priori expectation 
with its negative coefficient but together with the one-year lagged variables of the dependent variable was 
statistically significant in terms of contributions to the dependent variable. On the whole, the study concludes 
that illegal oil trading has a negative effect on the level of per capita income in Nigeria. The paper hence 
suggests judicious utilization and equitable distribution of oil wealth and job creation as a panacea to small scale 
oil theft and capital punishment as a solution to large scale oil theft which will eventually translate to appreciable 
level of per capita income in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Per capita income, illegal oil trading, econometric, unit root, co-integration, granger causality. 
 
1. Introduction 
Oil theft, also known as illegal bunkering, is the act of hacking into pipelines to steal crude which is later refined 
or sold abroad (Ugwuanyi, 2013). It is an illicit trade that involves the theft of crude oil and its derivative 
products through a variety of mechanisms. Asuni (2009) refers to oil theft as oil taken from pipelines or flow 
stations, as well as extra crude oil added to legitimate cargo that is not accounted for. In support of the above 
positions, Obasi (2011) asserts that “illegal oil bunkering” as used in Nigeria is a generic term encompassing not 
only unauthorized loading of ships but also all acts involving the theft, diversion and smuggling of oil”.  
Ikelegbe (2005) noted that: 
 
‘‘There is a large scale illegal local and international trading on crude oil. This has grown from a few amateurs 
in the 1980s who utilized crude methods to extract crude from pipelines to a very sophisticated industry which 
uses advanced technologies to tap crude and sophisticated communications equipment to navigate through the 
maze of hundreds of creeks, rivers and rivulets. The oil theft syndicates have also graduated from boats and 
barges to ships and large oil tankers in the high seas. The stealing and smuggling of crude has become very 
extensive and large scale since the late 1990s’’. 
 
The import of the foregoing is that crude oil theft is any activity relating to the theft or sabotage of crude oil, 
facilities or installations in form of illegal bunkering, pipeline vandalism, fuel scooping, illegal refining, etc. 
Illegal oil bunkering is the most commonly known form of oil theft and it involves direct tapping of oil.  
The rise of oil theft in the Nigerian maritime domain in recent times is very alarming. Currently, 
Nigeria is losing over 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day to oil theft, pipeline vandalism and related criminal 
vices in the oil sector (Akpan 2013; Olusola, 2013; Odemwingie and Nda-Isaiah, 2013; Okere, 2013). In spite of 
the efforts of the Federal government to curtail the situation by increasing its security spending in recent years 
and devoting millions of naira annually to hire private security firms as well as equipping men and officers of the 
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), incessant destruction of pipelines and other oil facilities as 
well as trade in stolen oil by criminal cartels with international connections have continued unabated (Ugwuanyi, 
2013; Mernyi, 2014). This indicates that the huge investments of public funds on the safety of oil facilities have 
not yielded the desired results. Thus, the Nigerian economy is in an uncertain situation. She is facing an 
economic emergency unprecedented among the oil producers of the world. Something urgent needs to be done to 
reverse the ugly trend. For instance, Nigeria has been tagged the most country plagued by oil theft among her 
contemporaries of Indonesia, Russia, Iraq and Mexico. Statistics of oil theft among these major oil-producing 
countries shows that Nigeria is losing as much as 400,000bpd which is equivalent to losses of US$1.7billion a 
month (Dalby, 2014). This is a colossal loss compared to a total theft of 5,000 to 10,000bpd and just 2,000 to 
3,000bpd in Mexico and Indonesia respectively (Dalby, 2014). Thus, oil theft or illegal oil trading in the 
Nigeria’s maritime domain poses a challenge that threatens the very foundation of the oil industry and by 
extension the Nigerian economy (Garuba, 2012).  
  
There are various factors engendering the persistent thriving oil theft activities in the Nigeria’s 
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maritime domain. Adegbite (2013) states that there are many perceived reasons for engaging in crude oil theft. 
The reasons which vary from the mundane to the absurd include (a) poverty; (b) greed; (c) lack of respect for 
national economic survival; (d) get rich syndrome; (e) lack of gainful employment ; (f) exploiting the loopholes 
in the criminal justice system to circumvent the law ; (g) evolving culture of impunity from the wrong perception 
that some people are above the law; (h) weak institutional structure to checkmate criminals; (i) malice; and (j) 
bad governance (corruption, incompetency), just to mention a few. Igbuku (2014) also identifies some of the 
underlying causes of this scourge to include poverty, community-industry expectation mismatch, corruption, 
unemployment, ineffective law enforcement and poor governance. He adds that high unemployment, for instance 
has created a huge population of idle young people who are easily lured to oil related crimes. These crimes in 
turn are reinforced in the absence of clear deterrent measures, arising from the non-prosecution of alleged 
perpetrator.  
Despite her vast resources, Nigeria ranks among the most unequal countries in the world, according to 
the United Nation. The poverty in the north is in stark contrast to the more developed southern states. While in 
the oil-rich south-east, the residents of Delta and Akwa Ibom complain and belief that all the wealth they 
generate flows up the pipeline to Abuja and Lagos There is not absolute disconnection between the regions with 
high poverty rate, obvious income inequality and the level of menace of insecurity from such regions. It must be 
emphasized that it remains a paradox that despite the fact that the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion 
of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing every year. Poverty remains one of the critical challenges facing the 
population growth rate; while our average oil revenue per capita in the mid 1960s was US$33, our GDP per 
Capita was US$245. In the 2000s, our oil revenue per Capita had risen to US$325 but the GDP per Capita had 
remained at US$245. It impliedly means that the growth in oil revenue between 1960s and 2000s did not 
translate to any real economic development and improved standard of living (Olusegn, 2014). 
Prevalent poverty in Nigeria webbed around joblessness and income inequality has conspired to 
exacerbate the country’s security challenges. Also, some 120 million out of 160 million Nigerians live below 
N300 per day. “Nigeria’s population is about 170 million and we have up to 120 million people living below 
N300 per day. If that is a yardstick upon which to judge poverty, then we are in a very drastic situation” 
(Olusegn, 2014). 
There exist a dichotomy of wealth and poverty; there is a negative correlation between the Country’s 
enormous wealth and the spread of poverty in the country. This relationship of disparity between the growth of 
the GDP and increasing poverty is an indication of a skewed distribution of wealth in the country. Furthermore, 
research has shown that almost forty million (40m) people of Niger Delta, over Ninety percent (90%) live in 
poverty state. Many thanks to the role played by the government through the 13% Derivative Fund, the NDDC 
and many other intervention funds. However, despite the allocations over the years, it had not really translated to 
development of life for the common people. Findings have suggested that oil in some regions is only able to 
make marginal positive contributions to the livelihood of the people. Also, economic growth is critical to poverty 
reduction (Olusegn, 2014). 
The peculiarity of Nigerian economy signifies the critical state we are, where in the midst of huge 
government revenue; there is a contrast level of inequality and poverty. Localities where oil is actually located 
over time tend to suffer from lower economic growth and lower per capita incomes than the rest of the country. 
It is also pathetic that a high proportion of people living in oil-exporting countries, who are supposed to live in 
plenty, tend to remain poor…what a paradoxical sigh! (Olusegn, 2014). The objectives of this work were to 
establish the connection between maritime illegal oil trading on the level of per capita income in Nigeria and to 
raise prediction model on the relationship between the illegal oil trading and per capita income in Nigeria. 
 
2. Methodology 
This section deals with how data and the information used in the work had been gathered and analysed. It also 
deals with the research design, method of data collection and types of information generated. The study covered 
the period from 1995-2012. 
 
2.1 Research Design  
This study is designed to empirically investigate the illegal oil trading in the Nigerian maritime domain. 
Employing the E-views econometric software, the paper made use of the unit root, granger causality and co-
integration tests in order to basically produce the regression model thus, corresponding to the core interest area 
of the study namely, the relationship between the illegal oil trading and the level of per capita income in Nigeria. 
This relationship describes the model 7. 
 
2.2 Sources of Data 
As already stated, this study is designed to empirically investigate the link between illegal oil trading in the 
Nigerian maritime domain and the level of per capita income in Nigeria during the period of 1995-2012. Only 
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secondary data were used in the analysis and were obtained from the publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
National Planning Office, National Bureau for Statistics, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
and Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASSA). 
 
2.3 Data Analysis Methods 
The data set were analyzed by using two approaches namely; the Descriptive Statistics and Inferential Statistics. 
While the inferential statistics were employed to analyse the formulated hypotheses, other objectives of the study 
were to a large extent realized with the use of descriptive statistics. 
2.3.1Test of Hypothesis 
The hypothesis formulated was tested with a linear regression model with ordinary least square properties. 
Hence, a multiple regression approach was adopted. The analysis involved model specification and testing of the 
hypotheses. For the hypothesis, we made the per capita income (GDPC) the dependent variable. 
2.3.2 Test Statistics 
The time series data for the period, 1995-2012, were fitted into the linear function. This was to enable us predict 
the level of each dependent variable (the per capita income, GDPC) that can be achieved given known levels of 
the illegal oil trading explanatory variables. The test statistics therefore, include the Coefficient of Correlation 
(R), Coefficient of Determination (R2), the analysis of variance (ANOVA/F-ratio) and the t-distribution (t-test). 
While the ANOVA/F-test establishes the significance or otherwise, of the model as a whole, the coefficient of 
correlation seeks to test the strength or magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variable per capita 
income and the component of illegal oil trading as explanatory variable. The t-test seeks to test the extent of 
contribution or level of significance of the illegal oil trading explanatory variable to the dependent variable as we 
have in this study (per capita income). 
2.3.3 Test of the Model Significance:  
The first test carried out under the hypothesis testing was a test of the model significance. This seeks to test for 
the significance of the model as a whole. There are two ways to accomplish this; the analysis of variance or the 
coefficient of determination, R2. 
2.3.3.1 The Analysis of Variance Approach 
This statistical tool aims at splitting the variations of a variable, for example, in the hypothesis, the per capita 
income (GDPC) regressand with its component parts, variations in the dependent variable (GDPC), that are 
accounted for by the explanatory variables (maritime illegal oil trading variables), regressors, that is, the 
different sources of growth in the per capita income (GDPC) as produced by the maritime illegal oil trading 
components; are called the Explained Variations. Other sources not thus explained are due to random or chance 
factors. These are estimates of the population disturbance variable ‘u’ and are represented by ‘e’, otherwise 
referred to as the Residuals or error term. 
                                    Table 1: A Hypothetical ANOVA Table 
Source of 
Variation 
Sum of Squares  Degree of 
Freedom  
Mean Square 
Error 
F-Statistic 
Regression 
 
K-1 
 
MS SESS 
MS SRSS 
Residual1  
 
 
N-k  
F-Tabulated 
Total 
Variation 
 
 
N-1 
 Decision:  
if Fcal>Ftab 
reject Ho and 
Accept Ha 
 
For the hypotheses, the regression equations are presented thus; 
 
For example, rearranging equation 1 we have that; 
 
 
Summing both sides of equation 3 we get; 
 
In the Regression,  (estimate of the population disturbance), is given by  otherwise called the 
Residual Sum Of Squares (RSS)   is the sum of squares of the deviation of the per 
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capita gross domestic product ) variables from their mean. While the explained sum of squares  is 
gotten with the formula,  
Where;  
Therefore,    
2.3.3.2 The Coefficient of Determination, R
2
 Approach 
Another way to test for the model significance is through the coefficient of determination (R2). The R2 is 
calculated from the regression and it gives the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable, actual 
per capita gross domestic product that is explained by the independent variables, here the various illegal oil 
trading components.    R2, from the sample is a statistical estimate of the population, e2, (row squared). The value 
of R2 ranges between 0 and 1; 
-0.0 - - - -     -1.00       Inverse or negative variation 
0.00 - - - -  0.29 Highly insignificant, positive 
0.30 - - - -  0.49 Insignificant, positive 
0.70 - - - - 1.00 Highly significant, positive 
 
In setting up the test, the following hypothesis is tested: 
HO:ρ
2 = O          i.e., the regressors, the growth in the illegal oil trading  components, or sources of growth in the 
per capita gross domestic product, in a given year have no significant relationship with the 
actual growth of the per capita gross domestic product for that year. 
HAρ
2 > O        (One-tailed test of significance) i.e., at least, there is a significant relationship between one of the 
independent variables and the actual growth of the per capita gross domestic product. 
2.3.3.3 Decision Rule 
If F-ratio calculated is greater than the F-ratio tabulated or theoretical F, at alpha (a) – level of significance, and 
(K-1), (N-K), degrees of freedom, then we Reject Ho; and Accept Ha, and thus state that there is some truth in 
the estimated model (i.e. the regression model is significant since the regressors significantly account for the 
variation in the dependent variable (GDPCt). 
  
2.3.4 Test of Significance of the Explanatory Variables, t-Test 
Having established the significance of the estimated model, as a whole, next is to test the specific strengths of the 
various regressors in bringing about this result. This was carried out through the test on the estimated parameters 
of the regressors. The test-statistics or student t-test is calculated as follows: 
 
Where; 
βk = Estimate of the population parameters for the regressors (i.e. illegal oil trading components) 
Se(βk) = Standard error of the estimate 
2.3.4.1 Decision Rule 
 level of significance, we Reject H0 and Accept HA: to conclude that 
the variable belongs significantly to the model. 
 
2.4 Model Specification  
The dependent variable herein represented by the symbol  is regressed on the various components of 
illegal oil trading components figures for the corresponding period. These components of illegal oil trading are 
hereby represented as follows: 
VASt =     Total value of stolen oil in year t; 
VOSt =     Total volume of stolen oil in year t; 
The dependent variable, however, is as specified:     =     Level of per capita income in year t;   
 
2.5 Data Estimation 
Here, we note that the data set was estimated by carrying out the following tests; unit root, co-integration and 
granger causality tests. While the unit root test sought to test for the stationarity of the data set, so as to not 
produce spurious results, the informational content of the model were confirmed by the use of the co-integration 
test which helped to establish the nature of the model, whether short- or long-run relationships existed among the 
variables of the model. Finally, with the granger causality test, the direction of the effects was thus established. 
3. Data Presentation and Analysis 
As aforementioned, the data set for our estimation was generated from the websites of the NIMASSA, the CBN 
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and various publications from other related agencies, comprising of Nigeria data set on volume of oil theft, value 
of oil theft, gross domestic product and the per capita gross domestic product for the period, 1995-2012. 
            Table 2: Volume of Oil Theft, Value of Oil Theft, GDP, Per Capita Gross Domestic Product  
S/N YEAR VOS VAS GDP GDPC UNRATE 
1 1995 229565000 91.76 1933211.6 256 1.9 
2 1996 230031800 111.74 2702719.1 313 2.8 
3 1997 257947000 107.56 2801972.6 314 3.4 
4 1998 249207600 76.26 2708430.9 272 3.5 
5 1999 257791600 105.13 3194015 288 17.5 
6 2000 242350000 357.68 4582127.3 660 13.1 
7 2001 337322415 821.7 4725086 679 13.6 
8 2002 390463495 1079.1 6912381.3 682 12.6 
9 2003 237250000 786.6 8487031.6 676 14.8 
10 2004 193450000 812.8 11411067 727 13.4 
11 2005 156950000 1161.6 14572239 783 11.9 
12 2006 255500000 2240.6 18564595 804 13.9 
13 2007 255500000 2304 20657318 832 12.7 
14 2008 292000000 4056 24296329 862 14.9 
15 2009 694925910 6655.5 24794239 889 19.7 
16 2010 283078530 3525 33984754 926 21.1 
17 2011 386091290 6975 37543655 973 23.9 
18 2012 179514150 3239.5 39650864 1016 22 
        Source: NIMASSA, CBN, various years. 
 
3.1 Estimation of Data 
In this section, our objective is to establish the stationarity of the entire data set employed in the estimation. 
When a particular data set is found to be stationary, it then suffices that the data set can be relied upon for the 
estimation, having eliminated the possibility of spurious results. 
                                  Table 3: Unit Root Test for the Variables Employed 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Variable T-statistic. Critical value Order of 
Integration 
Significance 
VOS -3.527962 -3.052169 1(0) 5% 
VAS -8.649341 -3.920350 1(1) 5% 
GDP -3.287799 -3.065585 1(1) 5% 
GDPC -4.005954 -3.920350 1(1) 1% 
                  Source: E-views 6.0 Econometric Package 
 
3.2 Unit Root Test Result 
The unit root test was carried out using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test in order to determine whether the data 
set was stationary and the order of integration. It could be observed from Table 3 that only the volume of oil was 
stationary at level. Other variables turned out to be stationary at first difference. Generally, the data set can be 
relied upon for analysis as it shows no evidence of producing spurious results.   
 
3.3 The Co-integration Result 
Having established the stationarity of the data set, the Johansen co-integration test was applied, which adopts no 
exogenous variables as it is based on the vector auto regression (VAR) modeling. Here, we try to establish the 
presence of a short or long-run equilibrium existing between the variables and hence the estimated regression 
equation results. This result is as presented in Table 4. 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.16, 2015 
 
91 
                                  Table 4: Co-integration and Test Results 
 Johanssen Co-integration Test 
 
Mode
l 
 Number of Co-
integrating 
Equations 
Nature of  
Equilibriu
m 
1 Maritime Illegal Oil Trading and Per Capita 
Income 
Nil Short-run 
2 Maritime Illegal Oil Trading  and Unemployment 
Rate 
Nil Short-run 
Source: E-views 6.0 Econometric Package 
In Table 4, model 1 and 2 show evidence of no co-integrating equation and a short-run relationship 
existing between the variables.  
 
 3.4 The Granger Causality Results 
The results here do show that most of the pairs of variables have not, in fact produced significant causal effects. 
However, we observe a one-directional effect from the level of unemployment to the per capita income. More 
specifically, the level of unemployment granger causes the per capita income (GDPC) at 1%. 
 
3.5 Hypotheses Testing 
3.5.1The Influence of Illegal Oil Trading On Per Capita Income of Nigeria   
Here, one lead equation is to be estimated and the hypothesis states as follows: 
H0: There is no significant relationship between the level of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading and Per Capita Income 
in Nigeria 
The sub-hypotheses from H0 are as follows; 
H0a: The value of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Per Capita 
Income in Nigeria. 
H0b: The volume of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Per Capita 
Income in Nigeria. 
H0c: The one-year lagged variable of Per Capita Income has no significant effect on the Per Capita 
Income in Nigeria. 
                Table 5: Global Statistics for the Influence of Illegal Oil Trading on Per Capita Income 
Test-statistic 
 
MODEL 
LEAST SQUARE,WITH LAG 
R-square 0.889 
Adjusted R-square 0.862 
S.E of Regression 91.45772 
Sum of squared residual 108738.7 
Log likelihood -98.61162 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.930353 
Mean depend. Var 688.0000 
S.D. depend. Var 246.9147 
Akaike info criterion 12.071 
Schwarz criterion 12.268 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 12.091 
F-statistic 34.54002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002 
        NB:*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = Not significant. F-ratio tabulated DF (3, 14); 1% = 
5.56,  
          5% = 3.34, t-ratio DF (14); 1% = 2.98, 5% = 2.14. 
           Source: E-views 6. Statistical Package 
Table 5. above shows the results of the global statistics as produced under the model above.  
3.5.2 Test of Model Significance – ANOVA 
In order to confirm the specification status of our model, we made use of the ANOVA. The aim of using this 
method was to split the total variations of a variable (around its mean) into components which may be attributed 
a specific (additive) causes. For instance, variations in the dependent variable (GDPC) which are accounted for 
by the explanatory variables (maritime illegal oil trading variables)-independent variables, that is, the different 
sources of growth in the GDPC as produced by the maritime illegal oil trading components. To simplify the 
analysis we assumed that there was only one systematic factor influencing the variable being studied. Any 
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variation not accounted for by this (explanatory) factor was assumed to be random or (chance) variation, due to 
various random happenings.  
3.5.3 Decision Rule 
Employing the E-views software, we have that F–ratio calculated (34.54) > F–ratio critical (5.56, 3.34), at both 
1% and 5% levels of significance respectively, Since F–ratio calculated is greater than the critical F–ratio, we 
reject H0 to draw a conclusion that there is a significant relationship between the level of maritime illegal oil 
trading and per capita income in Nigeria. The estimated regression result is presented as follows: 
 
 
3.6 The Impact of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading On Per Capita Income (Sub-Hypotheses) 
The sub-hypotheses from H0 are as follows; 
H0a: The value of Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Per Capita Income in 
Nigeria. 
H0b: The volume of Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Per Capita Income in 
Nigeria. 
H0c: The one-year lagged variable of Per Capita Income has no significant effect on the Per Capita 
Income in Nigeria. 
Having tested the significance of the model, we had to go a step further to test the significance of the maritime 
illegal oil trading in contributing to the total variation in the level of per capita income. This was achieved 
through the use of the student t-test (refer to the regression result in Table 6). From Table 6, only the one-year-
lagged variable of per capita income proved to be significant contributors to the level of per capita income since 
the t-ratio calculated (5.25) > t-ratio critical (2.98, 2.14) at both 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. 
                                                 Table 6: T- Statistic Table-Per Capita Income 
NB:*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = Not significant. T-ratio DF (14); 1% = 2.98, 5% = 2.14. 
Source: E-views 6.0 Statistical Package.  
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
This section considered the relationship between maritime illegal oil trading robbery and the level of per capita 
income in Nigeria. This result revealed that a significant relationship actually exists between illegal oil trading 
and the level of per capita income, with only the one-year lagged variable of the per capita income exerting a 
significant effect on the level of per capita income in Nigeria. In addition, this model, with an R-squared of 
88.9% has shown that the changes in the explanatory variables taken together, have been able explain at least, 
88% of the total variations in the dependent variable, per capita income, thus, leaving only about 12% to chance 
occurrence. The estimated regression result is presented thus; 
 
From model 7 above, only the volume of maritime illegal oil trading, met the a priori expectation, with its 
negative sign. 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
This paper basically focused on the impact of illegal oil trading on the level of per capita income in Nigeria, 
covering the period, 1995-2012. Having this as the objective in mind, study found that a significant relationship 
exists between maritime illegal oil trading and the level of per capita income in Nigeria and that only the volume 
of illegal oil trading met the a priori expectation with its negative coefficient and effect on the level of per capita 
income in Nigeria. Thus, this study has been able to empirically determine the relationship existing between 
illegal oil trading and the level of per capita income in Nigeria. Therefore, through the determination of this 
relationship, prediction model was produced for predicting the level of per capita income to attain given that 
level of oil theft or illegal oil trading is known. The paper hence suggest judicious utilization and equitable 
Variable X1,Value of Oil Theft, 
VASt 
X2,Volume of Oil 
Theft, 
VOSt-1 
X3,One-year 
Lagged Variable of 
Per Capita Income, 
GDPCt-1 
Test Statistic 
Coefficient of the Variable  0.021351 -2.23E-07 0.804715 
Standard Error 0.021932 2.67E-07 0.153392 
T-Statistic Calculated 0.973488 
NS 
-0.833376 
NS 
5.246148 
*** 
T-Statistic Tabulated 1% 2.98 2.98 2.98 
T-Statistic Tabulated 5% 2.14 2.14 2.14 
Significance 0.35 0.42 0.00 
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distribution of oil wealth and job creation as a panacea to small scale oil theft and capital punishment as solution 
to large scale oil theft which will eventually translate to appreciable  level of per capita income in Nigeria. 
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